Policy Paper
International Policy Fellowship Program, 2001
A “Realistic” Approach to
Regional Security in the South Caucasus
(The Future of the
Caucasus)
George
Tarkhan-Mouravi
ABSTRACT
South Caucasus, after decades of enforced isolation,
is integrating into the international community and the global market. Global
processes and trends are playing more and more significant role in developments
in the region, which now needs to define its new role based on the realities of
its comparative advantages and its geopolitical environment. One should take
into consideration such global and regional processes as forthcoming
technological innovations, EU and NATO expansion, insurgence of international
terrorism, market forecasts and the prospects of available foreign investments,
as well as the risks of new pandemics, global environmental threats and
exhausting of natural resources. These global trends will certainly to great
extent shape the future of the Caucasus. The turning point was September 11 events and the subsequent
reshaping of the geopolitical disposition of forces. Caucasus, respectively,
acquires rapidly increasing strategic importance due to its central position
between Europe and potential zones of instability.
The
essence of the problem dealt in the present policy paper is instability,
insecurity and poor governance on all institutional levels of the states of
South Caucasus as the consequence of regional tensions, conflicts and mistrust
between nations. The paper intends to
analyse how security-related policies are developed in transitional societies
in their correlation to democratic processes and economic development, to
explore the nature and dynamics of strategic preferences and perceptions of
security threats among political élites and the population of Georgia
and other parts of former Soviet periphery, South Caucasus. These developments
and changes are studied as revealed through political statements, interviews,
in public discourse and voting - resulting from changing geopolitical realities
such as Kosovo crisis and NATO involvement, events in Macedonia, implications
of the September 11 tragedy and war in Afganistan, the change by international
community in reacting to regional crises from piecemeal approach to
comprehensive regional solutions, implications of the war in Chechnya, new
assertive Russian international policies and changing relations between Russia
and the West. It is intended to investigate also the impact of international
regimes and conflict prevention tools on local actors, and the impact of
external policies and humanitarian/mediating interventions as geared to such
arrangements, also the normative assumptions of actors both inside and outside
of the specific region.
The study applies to analysing the feasibility of
various models of comprehensive solutions for achieving regional security and
co-operative development objectives, and in particular on investigating
feasibility and implications of a "Stability Pact for South
Caucasus", an analogue of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, that
has been proposed, in different forms and wording by leading political figures
in the region, including the presidents of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and
Turkey. These models are analysed against the background of understanding of
the security issues for the Caucasus among the political élites in the
countries that play the most significant role in current events – i.e.
political actors such as the USA, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the states of
Southern Caucasus – Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. An assessment is conducted
to articulate perceived obstacles to the development of regional
security/stability instruments and arrangements from both the intra-state and
regional perspectives. The ultimate goal is supporting the development of long-term,
strategic thinking and planing among top-level policy-makers in the region,
empowering the society at large to follow, discuss, understand and participate
in designing the country security related (and other important) regional
policies.
The policy paper considers the conceptual basis
for discussing various regional arrangement models, while the essential idea of
the project is to seek for piecemeal solution to the process of regional
cooperation through effective security arrangements, European integration and
relevant international involvement. The stakeholders to such development are
all local and foreign governments concerned with stability in the region,
international organisations such as the OSCE, CoE, UNO, and others concerned
with regional peace and development. The geographic area directly involved is
the three countries of South Caucasus in the first place, but also broader
region of Black Sea/Caspian/North Caucasus, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, and
significant resources and technical assistance can be mobilised from various
sources, but primarily from such international actors such as US and EU, for
enforcing the effective cooperative model, which would imply the
institutionalisation of regional arrangement process, change of attitudes among
decision makers and the population, expert assessments.
Essential approach suggested
in the policy paper is to seek a piecemeal process for regional cooperation
through effective security arrangements, European integration and relevant
international involvement, with US as a key actor and mediator. Dealing with
conflicts (third parties may serve as observers, as in Karabakh case the
representatives of Karabakh may at initial stage), it also seems to be more
effective to discuss first practical matters of transportation, repatriation or
economic revival. It is suggested to declare a moratorium for discussing status
issues apart of general procedures and willingness to proceed (so, all external
players could make a joint declaration of unacceptability of unilateral
secession, as well as the unjustified use of violence), although this would not
be easy to achieve with the winning parties in conflict.
Step by step approach is a
realistic alternative to overall resolution when dealing with each conflict
separately, but keeping the regional dimension in mind should be preferable.
External players could form a joint structure to deal with all regional matters
from single perspective, and as a possible framework for this it is suggested
to create a group provisionally called Friends
of the UN Secretary General for the Caucasus. At the same time, the
countries of the region at some stage could enter a joint commission for
discussing issues of common interest, such as epidemics, trans-border crime and
drugs trafficking, environment, etc. This may be of great importance as part of
a confidence building process, as mistrust between countries and communities is
the major obstacle to progress.
The paper supports the
recent suggestion of defining a special status for the states of the South
Caucasus on their way to integration to EU membership, that would be weaker
than formal candidacy but require certain adjustment beyond OSCE and Council of
Europe standards. The EU could sign an agreement with all three republics on
the issue that they jointly may become candidates to EU accession if
certain conditions are met within say 10 year limit. This will exclude any of
the republics that violate some basic principles, i.e. democratic elections,
human rights, non-violence, providing thus not only virtual stick in the form
of sanctions but a carrot as well. Other measures include creating special
(free) economic zones under international regimes along the border line of a
conflict zone, or development triangles. Georgian territory in the neighborhood
of the Red Bridge near Azeri and Armenian border, playing today an important
role for informal economic exchanges between Azeri and Armenian businesses, bay
acquire an official status and special regime in order to strengthen further
the economic cooperation between parties. Special importance should be given to
the search for various schemes of NATO/US/Russia cooperation, especially in
Pankisi gorge, and maybe in the zone around Karabakh.
Summing up, the approach can
be described as: piecemeal process with international mediation and guarantees
at every stage; initiation broad public debate around the issue and much
attention to public relations aspect, involvement of all interest groups and
especially ethnic groups in the debate; gradual building on cooperational areas
with special attention to economic and security aspects... while alternative
implementation strategy in comparative time perspective may be preparing
detailed plans on [inter]governmental level and only later informing the
population, requesting the assistance of international actors in designing and
implementing the security arrangement process
GENERAL BACKGROUND
Key geographical location on
the crossroads of communications and transportation routes from Central Asia
and oil-rich Caspian region to Europe ascribes special importance to South
Caucasus for western investors and powers interested in acquiring access to
this geo-strategic regions, and is one of the main sources of continuously
increasing, if often disappointed, attention of western states and
organizations. At the same time, Russia is preserving a number of military
bases in Armenia and Georgia (and a radar station in Azerbaijan), all of them
in sensitive locations of actual/potential conflict, and in latter case is
exercising strong pressure for preserving most of them against the 1999
Istanbul agreements.
Unresolved conflicts in
Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia and heavy burden of many hundred thousands
of refugees and IDPs, while apart from purely humanitarian aspects highly
damaging for stability and economy, at the same time played a crucial role in
political reorientation of Georgia and Azerbaijan towards the West, cut off
communications and trade with the North, and in certain sense benefited their
sovereignty and independence, also attracting significant international
attention and assistance.
Foreign policy orientation is important reference
point for nation building, strongly favored or disfavored by the population and
the élites. For the general population, foreign orientation may have
important every-day connotation. So, among many changes that were brought by
the new independence is the radical reorientation from Russian language to
English. Still, one of the signs of political immaturity of the Caucasian states
and societies is the permanent referring to Russia as the main cause of
problems or/and the clue to the solution of most of problems.
There
is alarming inertia and passivity in both the Caucasian societies in general
and in the troubled communities in particular. Still, long-held beliefs about
the meaning of homeland, society, tradition and territory in one’s life,
relations between different subcultures, and expectations for the future, are
undergoing a re-examination and re-appraisal. Many elements in traditional
value orientation are gradually losing their authority or relevance, while
other elements still retain their force. Interethnic tensions and
ethno-territorial conflicts became the most noticeable part of new
after-cold-war political reality, becoming a strong force of disintegration -
ruining stability, prospects of development, and even elementary economic
self-sufficiency in former Soviet South. Changing governments have appeared
incapable or unwilling to maintain the forms of co-existence customary to the
Soviet past and to formulate strategies facilitating co-existence and
co-operation, while, opposite to it, some political élites have fully
exploited attractiveness of nationalist or secessionist slogans for building
their political careers and seizing power. Political support and commitment
needed to formulate and follow sustainable peaceful strategy is not guaranteed
today. It is essential but almost impossible to build partnerships between
opposing parties, formulate flexible strategies and forming consensus around
co-operation priorities in a situation in which political discourse is
dominated by emotions, leaderships are concerned with short-term political
interests and immediate benefits, while national and international institutions
that would take the responsibility for co-ordinating regional peace-building
process are either not working properly or are totally absent. Indeed, today
some governments seem to be more open today to real compromises. The obstacles
are however great.
Despite the demands posed by
the change of political and economic structure and environment, cultural and
political legacies hinder both élite and ordinary citizens in
reorienting toward values of personal or corporate responsibility, transparency
and accountability. Deeply rooted clientelism and corruption do not stimulate
people in power to encourage public participation, on the other hand
disillusioned ordinary citizens show apathy and accept the authority of those
in power. An important corollary is that there is widespread perception of
little control over decisions of government, little trust in others and low
satisfaction with own life. The way out from this closed, self-reinforcing
circle could be seen in the activation of politically conscious and active population
and in the will of the ruling party to incorporate population in policy making.
In the long run the political survival of today’s élites depends on this
will as further economic hardship, high rate of inequality and consequent
popular discontent may swing the pendulum of public support to reform in
opposite direction. Poor economic performance and continuous insecurity and
humiliation may easily undermine the still embryonic democratic political
culture.
Another alarming tendency is
the great gap between political élites, actively involved in governance
or directing opposition politics, and the population at large, emotionally
concerned but lacking skills and levers for more political participation.
Unwillingness of élites to take responsibility and initiatives needed
for successful democratic transformation, lack of independent and creative
thinking; are further aggravated by mutual suspicion and mistrust of political
élites and masses, the center and the periphery. Élites have no
confidence in masses, try to avoid where possible democratic structures and
procedures of decision making under the pretext of democratic immaturity of
population and its lack of political knowledge and skills, or putatively due to
economic hardship or external security threats. Similar attitude can be
observed in relation to regional authorities, and especially to ethnic or
religious minorities. Only a robust civil society, with the capacity to
generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state, can resist
democratic reversal and is a remedy against such tendencies. There is urgent
need for development of participatory approach at all levels of governance, and
to empowering individuals and communities to self-organize on the issues of
protecting their interests, to create effective trade unions, consumer
societies or other non-governmental structures.
Today it is fashionable to speak about the failure
of south Caucasian societies to build democratic states, free of corruption and
of latent instability. Still, although the changes during last few years are
hardly inspiring, they are far from catastrophic. Summing up one may say that
while there are many obstacles to rapid positive change in civic culture and
institutions in the direction of more mature, efficient and democratic ones,
the process is nevertheless on move, with younger generation showing more
active and positive stance. Orientations toward the western models and values,
support of market oriented reform and of civic values is good reason for moderate
optimism with regards to immediate future, and for much brighter hopes in the
long run.
However, one of the common
features that is among the major sources of instability is overall
impoverishment of both the population and the state in all of the three
countries of the region, and even more so in the secessionist territories of
Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While the
population's real income had started to increase during last few years,
inequality stays remarkably high or grows. International organisations may have
on agenda eradication of poverty as a general objective, but for the (good)
governments in South Caucasus the priorities should be less formal
characteristics such as satisfaction with life, confidence in the future, and
maximum reduction of the numbers and improvement of conditions of marginalized,
discriminated and vulnerable.
General economic crisis is an important, but not a single cause of
widespread poverty and malfunctioning of the welfare system. Political,
cultural and institutional factors are of no less importance. Lack of
investment in industrial production is blamed but this is a corollary of other
factors – low revenues (compared to trade), no confidence in future,
corruption, no protection from racket or undue harassment by taxation and law
enforcement officers, political instability, unfair competition and weak
anti-monopolistic instruments, poor infrastructure, lack of qualified
personnel, poor managerial skills and institutional culture, low morale of the
workforce. It
goes beyond saying that the poor are more easily radicalized around
nationalistic, fundamentalist and militant slogans, and the massive
unemployment among the young people is a dangerous feed ground for crime and
unrest, and further gap between the new rich and the new poor may ultimately
lead to a social explosion, or even worse – its diversion to a new round of
interethnic hostility.
Although regional stability
and peaceful development are the declared goals of all influential political
forces throughout South Caucasus, there are numerous obstacles to this, and the
main such factors are underdeveloped participatory democracy, political
infantility of élites, and the deeply rooted mutual mistrust between
major actors. The Caucasus is a region with open conflicts and complicated
security conditions. Three countries of the South Caucasus that emerged as
independent sovereign states with the disintegration of the USSR are coping
with various economic, social and political problems. However, the security
issue remains to be one of the most central ones in this transition process, as
geopolitical environment and the legacies of the past had made this region to
be among the most explosive and unstable regions of the world.
There are two basic internal sources of instability in the region: sense
of insecurity among ethnic groups, and struggle for benefits/resources. Three
main types of issues are especially sensitive from this viewpoint: demography;
status and governance; and access to/control of economic resources. Any
strategy aiming at resolution of a conflict should deal with these issues to be
successful. If a conflict can be resolved in a sustainable way, it should
change the situation into a positive sum game from all internal players,
including respective political élites that often have become hostages of
their own victories, and myths that they have nourished. Sides in conflict live
for long time in the illusion that time is working for them, however, realising
now how much they lose from the frozen status of the conflicts, experiencing
major economic, demographic and political losses. Various dimensions and
approaches that may lead to such transformation of the format of conflicts and
their subsequent resolution are of special importance, particularly from the
perspective of regional co-operation. However, above-described internal sources
of instability are supplemented by the projected interests of global and
regional powers into the Caucasian-Caspian region that create additional
potential for instability. Governments in the region have in such conditions to
pursue an aim of creating strong military potential as a necessary component of
the state-building process, and at the same time maintain civilian control over
the military in order to avoid possible destabilisation caused by weak
government vs. strengthening power of the military. Another conflict is between
the desire to allocate scare resources to the economic development, while the
fears for instability and nationalist agenda support further over-funding of
the military development. Existing internal or interstate conflicts are
additional argument for such tendency, and there is emerging arms contest
between the local players in the region, aggravated by military support of some
of them by destabilising Russian effort such as the military action in
Chechnya, further aggravated by the presence of Russian military bases in
Georgia and Armenia.
Most of populist rhetoric is
exploiting ethnic myths about legitimate rights of one or another group
violated by opponents, aiming strengthening/restoration of status, or
legitimization of de facto situation.
Even while lacking basic knowledge of ethnology, international law, history, or
linguistics, people are readily operating with argumentation, whatever biased,
from these fields, in order to support popular myths interpreting situation in
favor of their respective ethnic group. Conflicts with explicit winners and
losers (Karabakh, Abkhazia), unlike cases with no definite winning party (Ossetia),
are followed normally by massive ethnic cleansing and total reshuffling of
ethno-demographic structure of the population. These conflicts are especially
difficult to cope with, as the winners would by no means give up their gains
(mainly in the sense of demographic balance or de facto status) and return to the status quo ante belli.
The key conflict in South Caucasus seems to be the one of Mountainous
Karabakh, both due to greatest strategic stakes involved, and the internal
difficulty of solving it after the sad history of atrocities and mutual hatred.
The situation is aggravated by the lack of flexibility of political forces that
invested in nationalism and ultimate victory, but also with the victims’
complexes on both sides. Armenians deeply distrust any Turkic speaking group in
their neighbourhood, never forgetting the genocide in Turkey, but also the
first wave of extreme violence in Sumgait that triggered the conflict. Azeris
in their turn dwell on their bitter memories of Gorbachov-time massacre in Baku
(Armenians are considered as strategic forepost of the heir of the USSR –
Russia, in the region, who provided huge amounts of armament to military
training to Armenian army), even more bitter of their disastrous failure in the
war and the atrocities committed by Armenians at Fizuli and elsewhere. Armenia,
lacking freedom of strategic manoeuvre due to its landlocked location between
Turkey and Azerbaijan, relies heavily on strategic partnership with Russia,
trying to maintain good relations with neighbouring Iran and at the same time
with the USA. However, it is more and more clear that no recovery and no stable
development are possible with the solution of the conflict. However, the
governments are hostages of their previous policies, and although certain steps
forward were made, it is more and more clear, that neither Armenian president
(himself from Karabakh), nor aged Aliev can afford radical decisions needed for
the real progress in this direction, as different from export-oriented peaceful
rhetoric. In the spring 2001, after a number of preliminary meetings in Paris
arranged by Jacques Chirac, the hopes emerged once again when the presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan made in Key West, Florida, significant progress toward
achieving some conceptual convergence of viewpoints with respect to resolving
the Karabakh conflict. However, soon after that it became only too clear that
neither societies would accept compromise after so much hate-speeches and so
many promises of final and uncompromising victory. Already three peace
proposals prepared by the Minsk group of mediators had been rejected, and now
the new proposal is going the same way.
Similar situation is in Abkhazia, where in spite of numerous
negotiations and mediations lies the basic unwillingness of parties to conflict
to find any mutually acceptable compromise. And indeed, on 5 February, Abkhaz
representatives repeated their refusal to receive a framework document
developed by representatives of the UN and the Friends UN Secretary General for
Georgia group - "Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competences
between Tbilisi and Sukhumi" as the basis of such talks, strongly
supported by UN Security Council in its resolution 1393 of 31 January 2002. The
reason is that this resolution, like previous resolutions on this topic,
recognizes Abkhazia's status as within the state of Georgia, which is
unacceptable for Abkhasian side, even though the two key demands of the Abkhaz
leadership -- that Georgian refugees cease the protest action on the Inguri
bridge and that Georgian armed forces pull back from the Kodori Gorge -- were
being met. So, they is no easy way out of the deadlock, as Abkhazians would not
agree to any limitation of their sovereignty, while Georgians will never
recognise the latter. At the same time the Georgians will demand the
unconditional return of refugees, which may actually reverse the demographic
dominance of Abkhazians after the ethnic cleansing as a result of their
military victory, and this will not be accepted, until the resolution of the
status issue, which cannot be resolved. So, negotiations are rather a show, as
there is no inclination to come to compromise with regards to two basic issues
– return of the forced migrants, IDPs, and the status.
Most debates today revolve around the legal status of secessionist
quasi-states within / vis-à-vis former metropolies. Absence of clearly
formulated and widely supported strategy in resolution of the ethno-territorial
conflicts is still a problem. There were unfortunately little signs until very
recently that sides in conflict are actually looking for specific arrangements
in a constructive way (contrary to all rhetoric about doing so). The issue of
status used to be a pretext for blocking negotiations and by this preventing
the return of the IDPs/refugees which may have endangered the demographic
balance that emerged after the war. The negotiation process was often only
means to demonstrate their good intentions and readiness to solve the conflict
along the internationally favoured terms, while there was no real will to seek
compromise. Despite their frequent statements, none of the sides wanted to go
at the heart of the matter and to solve the legal status problem, as they
preferred to wait until better bargaining positions are secured, if no explicit
gain was possible immediately. However, the standstill in the negotiations
becomes more and more damaging for parties. Postponing some decisions until the
time when the sides have better basis for mutual understanding while dealing with
other more copable issues, designing a provisional status on the basis of the
functional needs and approach, and in the meanwhile proceeding in other
directions, is the viewpoint which seems to be reasonable.
Handling all these, and many other problems, is a
formidable task for relatively young “democracies”. However, there is no
alternative, and it is rather the point of how quickly nations will mature. Indeed, today governments seem to be more open today to real compromises.
The obstacles are however great. The most important is the unwillingness of
winners (in conflicts) to risk the restoration of the status quo ante belli, i.e. to return to a situation in which they
would become again a minority that cannot preserve the monopoly of power in a
democratic scenario of development, independently from the legal status they
would achieve within the framework of the bigger states. Now, governments are
hostages to their declarations and promises, while the majority of differences
are, contrary to a popular opinion, not mutually exclusive but rather symbolic
or terminological by nature, and could be coped with if due effort is applied.
Pressures on the conflicting parties, both from without and from within, are
mounting, while the leaderships, until recently demonstrating the manifest lack
of will to resolve the conflict, now seem to become more flexible and
compromising. The present situation cannot survive in the longer run and “the
illusion of time”, i.e. belief that important decisions can be postponed to the
distant future, is as dangerous an illusion as ever. Time is working against
the interests of all sides, no party involved is to benefit from a further
postponement of a peace settlement. While it is important to speculate on how
and when the solution to Caucasian conflicts will be found, it may be of more
immediate value to pose the question of where alternative ideas and influences
that could shape the future solution will come from.
New geopolitical realities,
such as expansion of NATO and EU to the East, Russian invasion and humanitarian
catastrophe in Chechnya started to change the seemingly frozen situation. Not
all aspects of political processes are easy to interpret, although their
influence is great. One of the most important new developments was linked to
the small territory in the neighbourhood to the zone of
instability in Chechnia – Pankisi gorge, where about 8 thousand of refugees
from Chechnya found asylum, mostly women and children. Russia’s accusations
that the place became a hideout for Chechen warriors, although not justified by
OSCE observers, was substantiated by other indications. It seems that indeed
Pankisi, apart from becoming the key focus for numerous kidnappings, drugs and
arms trafficking, became indeed :an important political issue, and a lever of
pressure on the Georgian government (including bombing of the Georgian
territory by Russian aircraft). Russia demands of the presence of its military
on the Georgian side of the border failed, an currently the demand is to
repatriate Chechen refugees back to Chechnya, totally inadmissible for
humanitarian reasons and contradicting the international agreements on refugee
status (Geneva
Convention, in the first place). However the most
interesting developments are linked to recent announcement by Russian and
American officials about the possibility of some Al Qaeda gunmen hiding in
Pankisi. Although the statements of Russian officials are not taken today
seriously, at some stage this leads to stronger American presence (in the
initial form of military observers or advisors) and certain reshaping of
security conditions.
In general, there are a number of factors
restricting the movement toward regional stability, security and cooperation,
both external and internal. Among the main external
factors are:
·
Unwillingness on the part of some international
actors to establish stability in the region and contrary to that, attempts of
manipulation in respective direction, for the sake of some political or group
interests or benefits;
·
Lack of commitment among international actors
who support the peace/reconciliation process; Lack of resources to make a
breakthrough; Lack of co-ordination between main actors.
However, following internal
factors are by no means of less significance:
·
Unwillingness of political
élites/decision makers to change status quo and thus put their
positions/careers under risk; having become hostages to their own previous
policies and rhetoric, or lose career or economic benefits; Economy of conflict
in general, linked to security/protection trade, drugs and arms trafficking, or
control over resources, making status quo economically beneficial for some
decision makers or population groups;
·
Mental inertia among the élites and the
population, deep roots of exclusive ethnic nationalism, intolerance and
animosities; At the same time, weakness and impoverishment of the state and
hence abundance of external levers of influence, political, military and
economic;
·
Poor governance: i.e. no conceptual thinking
among governments, no team approach among them, dominance of
personal/career/group interests in decision making, over-centralisation of
power in capitals vs. poor control in regions or over institutions, lack of
material and intellectual resources at the disposal of governments, underdeveloped
state institutions such as the army or law enforcement or judiciary, poor
institutional/structural organisation of governments;
·
Little participation of the population in
decision-making and political process, weak legal consciousness and respect to the
rule of law, lack of democratic experience, skills and attitudes,
susceptibility to populist/nationalist propaganda, impoverishment of the
population and hence dominance of short-term economic concerns,
As professor Ronald Suny put it, “Because of the interrelations of the
economic, ecological and ethnic problems in the South Caucasus, regional
solutions are essential…” South Caucasus is a small region, rich in history,
culture, people and natural resources. Three states of South Caucasus, due to
existing tensions either between them or to internal problems within their
respective territories, are yet unable to create healthy, effective and stable
framework for security and co-operation, but there is no alternative to doing
this at the end.
In general, there are two types of problems related to difficulty in
achieving regional security, stability and co-operation from the viewpoint of
their predominant location in present time and in future: a) Immediate
situation and short-term-trends that require urgent political, economic or
military response; and b) Long and medium-term trends and difficulties that
require strategic, step-by-step development-oriented approach.
Apart to general
geopolitical changes discussed above, there are some regional developments that
are of great importance, such as Russian invasion and humanitarian catastrophe
in Chechnya, the struggle for Caspian oil transit routes, political violence in
Armenia, rising unrest in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, increased American involvement
in the search for settlement in Karabakh, decline of Russian state and resource
potential, but also lessons of Afganistan, Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo and
Macedonia that are changing the map of political sympathies and perceived
threats.
Gradual increase of
perception of Russia as threat for stability and security, is now mixed with
other perceptions - that of weakening power with more peaceful aspirations.
While in previous years political élites in the countries of the region
perceived Russia as a threat but also as a hope (e.g. for helping to solve
ethno-territorial conflicts to the benefit of one or another party), revealing
infantile attitude towards former metropolis, at the same time considering the
West as more desirable but remote and indifferent potential supporter, now this
attitude towards the West is also rapidly changing. Establishing closer links
with the West becomes a reality, while Russia is losing its image of a paternal
superpower, both due to demonstration of its weaknesses and its civil and moral
degradation. Orientation to the West, paradoxically enough, increases at the
same time the threat perception originating from Russia, which is supposed to
punish renegades for orientation change.
Through globalization of
media, events in even most remote regions of the world like Indonesia are
forming the new understanding of internationally recognized code of behavior,
but also changes the perception of threats and political options, both among
the population and the élites. At the same time, all political actors
are getting used to act keeping in mind how their actions will be presented by
CNN and news agencies, and through them influence the international community.
Nevertheless, many decisions of the policy-makers are based on vaguely formulated
and understood state goals, enemy images and threat perceptions, as well as on
often chaotic attempts to define possible implications of political decisions
that may lead to perpetuating conflict and instability. The alternative is
explicit formulation of policy priorities backed by feasibility assessments and
multi-scenario planning. Correspondingly, stated goals for security-related
policy are still more strongly correlated to historical mythical or irrational
prejudices and beliefs, enemy images and traditional enmities, than realistic
political analysis and calculation, although the slow and gradual change can be
observed. Rationalization of one or another political decision often hides
these irrationalities under the disguise of pseudo-objective argumentation, but
these deliberately or instinctively hidden roots and fears can be revealed
through indirect methods of observation.
The governments are
currently considering various possibilities for introducing territorial
re-arrangement and decentralisation of power gradually and carefully over a
number of years. Among the options discussed today, in
particular in the case of Georgia and to less extent Azerbaijan, are the
prospects of federal territorial arrangements, considered to be a remedy for
the countries with recent experience of still unresolved ethno-territorial
conflicts and complicated security conditions. Various approaches need to be
applied in needed interdisciplinary study of such possibility: legal, economic
and sociological. Although one should realise that today any development in the
direction of federalism is in fact dependent upon the ability to resolve
suspended conflicts in Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it is worth
studying the possible benefits/problems related to democratic forms of
territorial arrangement in multi-ethnic state. There is certain need to articulate the
perceived obstacles to federal development — particularly the psychological and
political obstacles — from both the country and the regional perspectives.
Existing experience is that in such situations, it is essential to understand
the psychological and historical issues that are intertwined with the more
obvious economic, legal, and social issues. Once articulated and understood,
these psychological and political issues can then be taken into consideration
when developing ways to solve the economic, legal and other challenges
involved. Apart from purely scientific importance, this
issue will become relevant as a central point in resolving the conflicts, and
besides it could be an important advocacy tool. It is important to publicly
discuss the potential and prospects for federal territorial arrangement and its
impact on the security situation, to design alternative formats for territorial
organisation of the South Caucasian states in the direction of federal
arrangement and decentralisation of governance in administrative, economic and
social spheres, investigate basic principles and problems of establishing
federalism from the viewpoint of its introduction under complex transitional
conditions, such as federalism and financial decentralisation, financial and
tax relationship between federal and regional government, federalism and
national territories, reintegrating problems of Karabakh, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, liquidation of totalitarian heritage. On this path one may need to
study various classical and modern (symmetrical and asymmetrical) federal
systems, and in particular the time-tested Spanish and Belgian traditions of
federalism and the British experience of transition, and look for appropriate
profiles for the Caucasus that will be well fit for its circumstances and
conditions.
As the Caucasus is integrating both into the
international community, global processes and trends are playing a more
significant role in the region. Nowadays, Stability
Pact for the Caucasus (originating from analogy to the Stability Pact for
Southeastern Europe) has become a mantra that is repeated over and over again
by different leaders in and out of the region, while several task forces and
research groups are studying various possible models and their implications. In
theory, there is much talk about regionalization and regional security
arrangements, but there are conflicting interests involved, there is long way
until any universally acceptable model can be designed. During the last year, a number of regional and global developments took
place that changed the perspective and the conditions for conducting the
planned research. These were such events as creation of a new potential
conflict zone in the Pankisi valley on the Chechenian border, the initiatives
of the US government in the direction of solving the Karabakh conflict, the new
clashes involving Chechenian fighters in the conflict zone in Abkhazia, the
September 11 events in New York and Washington and the subsequent reshaping of
the geopolitical disposition of forces.
While South Caucasus was considered to be a region
in its own right since the Russian takeover in early 19th century, and
Transcaucasian Federation existed as a territorial structure throughout early
Soviet history, recent attempts to reconsider regional arrangements count
several years since mid-90s. So, already back in 1996 Georgian President
Shevardnadze (February 22, 1996) stated that the Caucasus was the zone of life
interest for Georgia, and that stabilization of the political situation in the
region, creation of strong, durable guarantees of peace is of utmost importance
for safeguarding national security and prosperity. Azeri and Georgian
Presidents demonstrated much willingness in promoting the idea of regional
security and cooperation, hoping to exploit this idea for securing the
territorial integrity in their respective countries troubled by unresolved
conflicts, hoping as well from grand-scale international transit projects such
as TRACECA of Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. So, on 6th February, 1996, they issued
joint declaration “On Peace, Security and Co-Operation in the Caucasus Region”,
while their initiatives were also reflected in the Statement of the
Participants of the Kislovodsk Summit of 31th May, 1997, “On Mutual
Understanding, Peace and Inter-Ethnic Accord in the Caucasus”, as well as in
subsequent Declaration of the heads of states of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia
and Russia and the renown concept of the “Peaceful Caucasus”. At the OSCE
Istanbul Summit of 1999 both President Aliev of Azerbaijan and President
Kocharian of Armenia declared their willingness to force the creation of
regional security arrangements. President Aliev went even further and stressed
the necessity to design a “Security and Co-operation Pact for South Caucasus”
similar to the “Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe”. However, while the
statements by Aliev and Kocharian sound so similar in speaking about regional
arrangements, the real content of their respective concepts is based on totally
different vision with regards to the participation of third parties (Iran,
Russia), as well as the prospects for resolving the Karabakh conflict. Still,
they show the relevance and timeliness of the idea and the need for further
elaboration and discussion of multilateral regional security mechanisms. Even
more specific was President Demirel of Turkey when he spoke (in February 2000)
of the necessity to develop the “Stability Pact for South Caucasus” as a
favourable tool for resolving regional problems.
The concept of the Stability
Pact for South Caucasus is closely inter-linked with other regional or
international initiatives such as BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation), GUUAM
(Georgia-Ukraine-Uzbekistan-Azerbaijan-Moldova), NATO Partnership for Peace,
and others that (the latter at least unlike the first two) play increasing role
in regional politics. Recent political developments and trends make the idea of
the Stability Pact gradually more and more attractive and even fashionable. It
is studied and discussed by various think tanks and policy research institutes
(e.g. a group of Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) headed by Dr. M.
Emerson works on this issue in Brussels), and whatever form it may take
finally, we believe it to be one of the most promising and rich concepts that
has emerged as a reaction to easily identifiable need to find general framework
for resolving complicated bunch of interrelated problems characteristic for South
Caucasus. However, the limited success of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern
Europe, as well as theoretical deficiencies of the existing draft projects,
make the attraction of such ideas less visible now than they used be a year
ago. Still, the most serious obstacle to developing designs for regional
security arrangements is the accelerating speed of geopolitical changes,
starting after the accent to power of Putin and then Bush to presidency, but
especially after the seismic reverberations of the September 11 attack on
American cities have caused. It seems that some predictability in geopolitical
environment is a necessary prerequisite for any effective regional arrangement,
although developing various theoretical frameworks for integration models may
be a very useful contribution for the future.
As “A Stability Pact for the
Caucasus” prepared by the CEPS in May 2000 on the initiative of the OSCE High
Commissioner for National Minorities Max van der Stoel, along with its
supplements and modifications, is the only comprehensive document considering
the model and procedures in establishing regional stability and cooperation, it
is important to consider its basic ideas and general approach. The main idea is
“to draw on modern European models of shared sovereignty, interdependence and
multi-tier governing structures. Three actions were proposed in the framework
of the model: “1) Conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia; 2) regional security order under OSCE; 3) Initiation of a South
Caucasus Community; as well as three more actions for wider regional
cooperation: 4) EU and Russia to develop a Southern Dimension[1]
cooperation; 5) Enhanced role for Black Sea Economic Cooperation; 6) Improved
legal framework for oil and gas (Caspian Seabed, pipeline transit protocol);
Plus, overarching mechanism for Stability Pact strategy, consultation and
coordination.”
Of course, these are very
welcome actions provided they are feasible. However, the document suggests
certain procedures and approaches in achieving these objectives that do not
sound as fully realistic. In particular, it is stated that “[t]here would be priority given to resolution of the
conflicts, but the international community should not be waiting for the
conflicts to be settled before opening up such perspectives of a wider
cooperative strategy for the whole region. On the contrary, elements of a new regional order would
be built into political settlements of the conflicts.” And, “[a] careful
attempt should be made to find an optimal balance between solutions for the
South Caucasus and a wider regional order
inclusive of the interests of Russia…” Throughout the document a number of
interesting European-style solutions, as well as scenarios for conflict
resolution are discussed and advised, together with extensive explanations as
to why Russia should desire to “cooperate fully in a Stability Pact for the
Caucasus along the lines proposed”. It is also with full justification stated
that “[t]he status quo is highly
unsatisfactory for the peoples of the South Caucasus, and sufficient time
has elapsed since the wars for settlement now to be reached.” However, although
the logic of the document is clear and transparent, it is hardly plausible that
any of these statements go far beyond wishful thinking, which is quite an
unfortunate but hard fact.
It is hardly possible that
any sides would agree to decide (although they may be quite happy to discuss)
any comprehensive regional arrangement model with adversaries before the
respective conflicts are resolved, which is still a distant perspective.
Russia, although much more cooperative currently in Minsk Group negotiations,
just recently bombed Georgian territory and its parliament and officials
continuously issue threats and hostile statements in Georgia’s address, so
seemingly it is long way till she realizes its real interests, if only there is
such thing as Russia - politically homogeneous power center concerned with
clearly defined and consistent state interests in South Caucasus (the same is
true with regards to any of the governments of the region). And finally, it
needs to be proved that the status quo is highly unsatisfactory for the
peoples of the South Caucasus, as unfortunately the population and major
political forces are not yet ready to accept significant compromises, as
demonstrated by the fall of Armenian ex-president Levon Ter-Petrossian, or by
the recent failure of the Key West agreements on Karabakh, when the two
presidents appeared incapable to sell the positive results of their
negotiations to their respective peoples and political élites. However, if, as a result of the efforts suggested by the document there
is little progress toward establishing mechanisms for securing sustainable
stability, which is highly plausible, outcomes are difficult to predict but
rather status quo will be maintained against the background of high risk of
instability. This means that different approaches should be considered as
alternatives, in order to compare options.
While no parallel solution
for the conflict and for regional cooperation seems to be feasible, there are
certain general principles that have better prospects than seeking
comprehensive regional model before the resolution of conflicts. It seems that
although for each of the conflicts a comprehensive peace settlement can and
should be a preferable option (as advocated by Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh,
chief mediator in Key West), due to the scale of overall damage caused by the
conflict, - open-end, incremental, piecemeal approach seems to be by far more
effective in dealing with regional issues. At the same time, comprehensive
models, but also and rather, the principles and frameworks for regional
arrangements, should be openly discussed and developed through second-trek
diplomacy, through unofficial meetings of experts, researchers and NGO
activists of all interested parties, preparing conceptual raw material for
future progress.
Thus, in contrast to the
CEPS model, our essential approach is to seek a piecemeal process for regional
cooperation through effective security arrangements, European integration and
relevant international involvement, with US as a key actor and mediator.
Dealing with conflicts (third parties may serve as observers, as in Karabakh
case the representatives of Karabakh may at initial stage do), it also seems to
be more effective to discuss first practical matters of transportation,
repatriation or economic revival. It seems to be advantageous to declare a
moratorium for discussing status issues apart of general procedures and
willingness to proceed (so, all external players could make a joint declaration
of unacceptability of unilateral secession, as well as the unjustified use of
violence), although this would not be easy to achieve with the winning parties
in conflict.
In case of repatriation to
Abkhazia, as a compromise limited repatriation to southern Abkhazia (anyway
taking place semi-informally) can be arranged with acquiring limited voting
rights, while Georgian authorities will continue to maintain the viewpoint (justified
by international law) that all IDPs have such rights independent from where
they currently live. Likewise, in Karabakh, return of the IDPs to regions
around Karabakh should be negotiated, in exchange for international guarantees
of non-use of violence throughout the moratorium period, and protection of
civil population at any time through international observers (OSCE) and
peacekeeping. Step by step approach is a realistic alternative to overall
resolution when dealing with each conflict separately, but keeping the regional
dimension in mind should be preferable. External players could form a joint
structure to deal with all regional matters from single perspective, and as a
possible framework for this it is suggested to create a group provisionally
called Friends of the UN Secretary
General for the Caucasus, along the same line as Friends of the UN
Secretary General for Georgia is now operating (informally called Friends of Georgia Group). At the same
time, the countries of the region at some stage could enter a joint commission
for discussing issues of common interest, such as epidemics, trans-border crime
and drugs trafficking, environment, etc. This may be of great importance as
part of a confidence building process, as mistrust between countries and
communities is the major obstacle to progress.
Among the rich ideas found
in the CEPS document is the suggestion of defining a special status for the
states of the South Caucasus on their way to integration to EU membership, that
would be weaker than formal candidacy but require certain adjustment beyond
OSCE and Council of Europe standards. As there is strong attraction toward
Europe throughout the region, such status could become a very useful instrument
for strengthening democratic institutions and principles. The EU could sign an
agreement with all three republics on the issue that they jointly may
become candidates to EU accession if certain conditions are met within say 10
year limit. This will exclude any of the republics that violate some basic
principles, i.e. democratic elections, human rights, non-violence, providing
thus not only virtual stick in the form of sanctions but a carrot as well.
Other measures as e.g. creating special (free) economic zones under
international regimes along the border line of a conflict zone (Gali region
could be a perfect training ground for such ideas), or development triangle.
Georgian territory in the neighborhood of the Red Bridge near Azeri and
Armenian border, playing today an important role for informal economic
exchanges between Azeri and Armenian businesses, bay acquire an official status
and special regime in order to strengthen further the economic cooperation
between parties. Special importance may be given to the search for various
schemes of NATO/US/Russia cooperation, especially in Pankisi gorge, and maybe
in the zone around Karabakh. US military presence in Georgia is a very
important step in that direction.
As stated above, alternative
scenarios include unsustainable status quo, i.e. maintaining unstable balance;
and slowing down positive changes, or even more risky approach in getting into
unilateral alliance with one of the major actors (e.g. Armenia-Russia) which is
depriving the respective state of any flexibility in negotiations and freedom
of maneuvre. At the same time, no explicit disadvantages of our approach are
comprehended, as the idea is not to design any concrete solution but rather
conceptual framework and direction, which is good for the societies to debate
even if other solutions are sought and found. However, the argument may run
that a comprehensive solution is still possible and preferable, although this
is contradicted by the last decade of developments. Summing up, our approach
can be described as: piecemeal process with international mediation and
guarantees at every stage; initiation broad public debate around the issue and
much attention to public relations aspect, involvement of all interest groups
and especially ethnic groups in the debate; gradual building on cooperational
areas with special attention to economic and security aspects... while
alternative implementation strategy in comparative time perspective may be
preparing detailed plans on [inter]governmental level and only later informing
the population, requesting the assistance of international actors in designing
and implementing the security arrangement process
[1] In analogy to “Northern Dimension” in the Baltic and Barentz Sea area within the framework of EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.